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NOTES
CAN A DEBTOR VOID A REAL PROPERTY LIEN THAT
EXCEEDS THE VALUE OF THE COLLATERAL?: AN
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 506(d) OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bank-
ruptcy Code)' to provide for equitable distribution among creditors
of a bankrupt debtor's assets and to provide the debtor with a
fresh start. 2 When a debtor files a petition in bankruptcy 3 the
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982)). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy
Code) repealed and replaced the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat, 840, repealed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at
II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982)). See generally B. WEiNTRAuB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW
MANuAL XXVIII (1986) (describing history of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). Congress
enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to modernize the bankruptcy laws. S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5757, 5788.
2. See REPORT OF THE CoMMIssION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 71 (1973) (stating that Congress enacted
federal bankruptcy laws to provide debtors with fresh start and to protect interest of creditors);
see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that one of primary
purposes of bankruptcy is to relieve honest debtor from oppressive indebtedness and thus
permit debtor fresh start); Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) (stating that dual
purpose of bankruptcy is, first, to convert debtor's bankruptcy estate into cash and distribute
cash among creditors and, second, to give debtor fresh start). See generally B. WEINTRAtm &
A. RESNICK, supra note 1, at 1-3, 1-4 (describing purposes of bankruptcy laws).
The discharge provision of Chapter Seven best exemplifies the fresh start policy of the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing debtor with
discharge of all prebankruptcy debts); see also S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5793 (stating
that discharge provision exemplifies Bankruptcy Code's fresh start policy). Although Congress
intended to provide debtors with a discharge of debts and thus a fresh start, Congress also
intended to provide creditors with an equitable distribution of the debtor's assets. See 11
U.S.C. § 704(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing that bankruptcy trustee shall collect and
reduce to money property of bankruptcy estate); id. § 726 (dictating order in which trustee
must distribute to creditors property of estate, which trustee has reduced to money under §
704 of Bankruptcy Code); infra note 5 (describing concept of property of estate under § 541
of Bankruptcy Code); infra note 3 (describing Chapter Seven proceeding in bankruptcy).
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982) (providing that debtor's filing of petition with bankruptcy
court commences voluntary case and order of relief). A voluntary petition in bankruptcy is a
petition that the debtor files. Id. An involuntary petition in bankruptcy is a petition that one
or more creditors file. See id. § 303(b) (providing that creditors who file petition under Chapter
Seven or Chapter Eleven commence involuntary case in bankruptcy court).
The Bankruptcy Code contains four types of bankruptcy cases: liquidation under Chapter
Seven, reorganization under Chapter Eleven, adjustment of a family farmer's debts under
Chapter Twelve, and adjustment of an individual's debts under Chapter Thirteen. See id. §§
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nonexempt' property of the debtor becomes the bankruptcy estate.5 The
debtor's real estate, often encumbered with several liens, typically becomes
a part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate., Upon the debtor's filing of the
bankruptcy petition, the Bankruptcy Code provides the debtor with an
automatic stay that prevents lienholders from using property of the bank-
701-766, 1101-1174, 1201-1231, 1301-1330 (describing four types of bankruptcy proceedings
under Bankruptcy Code). Commentators have divided the four specific types of bankruptcy
into two general forms of bankruptcy: liquidation proceedings under Chapter Seven and
rehabilitation proceedings under Chapters Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen. D. EPSTEIN, J.
LANDERS & S. NICKELS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 706 (3d ed. 4th printing 1987). Generally,
in a liquidation proceeding, a trustee collects the debtor's nonexempt property, which is
property that is eligible to become property of the bankruptcy estate, converts that property
to cash, and distributes the cash to the creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 726 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). Chapter Seven provides that a debtor may receive a discharge of his debts. Id. § 727.
Alternatively, in a rehabilitation proceeding the debtor usually retains his assets and attempts,
with future earnings, to pay his creditors. Id. §§ 1306(b), 1322(a). Chapter Eleven of the
Bankruptcy Code allows a financially distressed business enterprise to restructure its finances
and continue to operate and pay creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1171 (1982); see S. REP. No.
989, supra note 1, at 5795 (providing that Congress intended for financially distressed businesses
to reorganize and subsequently to pay debts). Although individuals are eligible for relief under
Chapter Eleven, Congress designed Chapter Eleven primarily for businesses. S. Rep. No. 989,
supra note 1, at 5795. Chapter Twelve of the Bankruptcy Code, which is another type of
rehabilitative chapter, allows a farmer to restructure his debts and to pay creditors. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1231 (1982). Like Chapter Twelve, Chapter Thirteen of the Bankruptcy Code enables
individual debtors, under court protection and supervision, to apply a portion of the debtor's
future earnings to pay creditors. Id. §§ 1301-1330; see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5799
(providing that purpose of Chapter Thirteen is to permit individual, by making periodic
payments to trustee, to pay debts and avoid bankruptcy).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing that nonexempt property is
property that debtor may retain and thus may prevent from becoming property of bankruptcy
estate). In allowing the debtor to exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate, Congress
intended to provide a debtor with the basic necessities of life so that even if creditors take
the debtor's nonexempt property, creditors will not leave the debtor destitute. H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEWS 5963, 6087.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). A petitioner's commencement of a
bankruptcy case creates a bankruptcy estate. Id. § 541(a). The bankruptcy estate includes all
of the debtor's legal or equitable interests in property, as of the commencement of the
bankruptcy case. Id. § 541(a)(1).
6. See id. § 541(a)(1) (providing that when debtor files petition in bankruptcy, debtor's
legal or equitable interests in property become property of estate).
7. Id. § 362. A bankruptcy stay prohibits the commencement or continuation of any
proceeding against the bankrupt. R. KRATova & R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 394 (9th ed.
1988). When a party files a petition in bankruptcy, the automatic stay arises by operation of
law. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The automatic stay is a fundamental
protection that the Bankruptcy Code provides to a debtor in bankruptcy. S. REP. No. 989,
supra note 1, at 5840. The automatic stay stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all
foreclosure actions by creditors. Id.
Although the automatic stay provides debtors with immediate relief from creditors, the
automatic stay also prevents one creditor from pursuing remedies against the debtor's assets
to the detriment of other creditors. B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 1, at 1-31. The
automatic stay, therefore, ensures that a bankruptcy court will distribute fairly and equally
the debtor's assets among creditors. Id. Accordingly, Congress did not intend for the automatic
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ruptcy estate to foreclose on their liens.8 To prevent lienholders from
recovering on claims to the extent that the claims exceed the fair market
value of the property of the bankruptcy estate, debtors recently have
attempted to use section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to void liens to
the extent that the liens exceed the fair market value of the debtor's real
property.9 Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a creditor's
lien which is not an allowed secured claim 10 is void." Under the Bankruptcy
stay to alter the substantive rights of creditors. Id. Congress intended merely that the automatic
stay stop creditors' collection efforts pending a bankruptcy court's determination of the
creditors" and debtors' rights. Id.
The automatic stay terminates automatically when the debtor's property is no longer
property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) (1982); see supra note 5 (description
of property of estate). Property ceases to be property of the bankruptcy estate upon a trustee's
sale or abandonment of the property or upon a bankruptcy court's exempting the property
from the bankruptcy estate. B. WnmniRAuB & A. REsNIcK, supra note 1, at 1-44. The automatic
stay also terminates when the bankruptcy court closes the case, dismisses the case, or denies
or grants a discharge to the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(A)-(C) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see
supra note 2 (discussing discharge). Although the automatic stay may terminate automatically,
a bankruptcy judge, upon a motion of any interested party who seeks relief from the stay,
may terminate, annul, modify, or condition the stay with cause. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), (d)(1),
(d)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see supra note 7 (discussing automatic
stay).
9. See Worrell v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 67 Bankr. 16, 17 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1986) (Chapter Seven debtor attempted to void under § 506(d) portion of real estate mortgage
lien to extent that lien exceeded fair market value of property); Maitland v. Central Fidelity
Bank ( In re Maitland), 61 Bankr. 130, 131 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (Chapter Seven debtors
sought to use § 506(d) to void liens against real property to extent that liens exceeded value
of property); Lindsey v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis ( In re Lindsey), 64 Bankr. 19, 21
(Bankr. C.D. 111. 1986) (Chapter Seven debtor attempted to void under § 506(d) real property
mortgage to extent that mortgage exceeded value of property); In re Sloan, 56 Bankr. 726,
726 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (Chapter Seven debtor sought to use § 506(d) to void creditor's
lien on residence of debtor); Lyons v. First Pa. Bank ( In re Lyons), 46 Bankr. 604, 605
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. E.D. 1985) (Chapter Seven debtors attempted to use § 506(d) to void
mortgage on principal residence to extent that amount of mortgage exceeded value of residence);
Cordes v. Geico Fin. Serv., Inc. ( In re Cordes), 37 Bankr. 582, 584 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984)
(Chapter Seven debtors attempted to void under § 506(d) lien on residence to extent that lien
exceeded amount of creditor's secured claim); In re Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308, 310 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1983) (Chapter Seven debtors attempted to void under § 506(d) real property lien
that exceeded value of collateral); Brace v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 33 Bankr. 91,
92 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, W.D. 1983) (Chapter Seven debtors argued that because first mortgage
exceeded fair market value of debtors' real estate, debtors could void under § 506(d) second
mortgage that was totally unsecured claim); Tanner v. FinanceAmerica Consumer Discount
Co. ( In re Tanner), 14 Bankr. 933, 935 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) (Chapter Seven debtor
attempted to void real property lien under § 506(d) to extent that lien exceeded value of
collateral); Walker v. First Fed. Say. & Loan ( In re Walker), 11 Bankr. 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.,
E.D. 1981) (Chapter Thirteen debtors attempted to void under § 506(d) remainder of second
real property mortgage that was unsecured claim).
10. See infra note 11 (definition of secured claim).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides, in pertinent part:
a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate
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Code, a creditor has an allowed secured claim to the extent of the value of
the property serving as collateral.' 2 A creditor has an unsecured claim,
has an interest. . .is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in such property. .and is an unsecured claim to
the extent that the value of such creditor's interest. . .is less than the amount of
such allowed claim.
Id. § 506(a). Additionally, section 506(a) provides that in determining the value of the creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in the property, a bankruptcy court should consider the purpose
of the valuation and the proposed use of the property. Id. Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code provides that "to the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an
allowed secured claim, such lien is void.. ." Id. § 506(d).
12. Id. § 506(a); see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5854 (providing that creditor has
secured claim to extent of value of his collateral); supra note 11 (providing statutory language
of § 506(a)).
The Bankruptcy Code defines the term "claim" as a right to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5807-08 (explaining that
Congress broadly defined term "claim" to enable bankruptcy courts to deal with all of debtor's
legal obligations, regardless of remoteness of obligation). Accordingly, a creditor under the
Bankruptcy Code is a holder of a claim against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986). The Bankruptcy Code allows a creditor to file with the bankruptcy court proof of
his claim. Id. § 501(a). Although the Bankruptcy Code does not mandate that a creditor file
proof of his claim, a creditor should file proof of his claim when filing would serve some
purpose. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5847 (providing that creditor should file proof
of claim, for example, when creditor has lien that is undersecured and creditor asserts claim
for balance of debt); see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing that
to maintain his lien, creditor with secured claim does not need to file proof of claim). If a
creditor files proof of his claim, the Bankruptcy Code provides that unless a party in interest
objects, the claim automatically is an allowed claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986); see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5848 (providing that proof of claim is prima
facie evidence of claim, which is allowed claim unless party in interest objects to claim). If a
party in interest objects to a claim, the bankruptcy court must determine after notice and
hearing the validity and amount of the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986);
see id. § 502(b)(1)-(8) (listing grounds for disallowance of claim in whole or in part).
Although section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the allowance of creditors' claims,
section 506(a) governs the secured status of creditors' claims. Compare id. § 502 (listing
circumstances under which bankruptcy court may allow or disallow creditor's claim); with id.
§ 506(a) (defining secured claim). Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a
creditor has a secured claim to the extent of the value of his collateral and the creditor has
an unsecured claim for the balance of his claim. Id. § 506(a); see H.R. REP. No. 595, supra
note 4, at 6141 (stating that creditor's claim is secured claim to extent of value of property
serving as collateral and creditor's claim is unsecured to extent of balance of creditor's claim).
The legislative history to section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code reveals that Congress
divided claims into secured and unsecured claims to protect the interests of both debtors and
creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982); see H.R. REp. No. 595, supra note 4, at 6141 (stating
that Congress divided claims into secured and unsecured claims to protect both debtors' and
creditors' interests). Section 506(a) protects the creditor's interest because once the court
determines that the creditor has a secured claim, the court must protect the collateral. 11
U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 6141 (stating that if bankruptcy
court determines that creditor has secured claim, bankruptcy court must not allow bankruptcy
estate to destroy collateral). Section 506(a) protects the debtor's interest because, by determining
the amount of the secured claim, a court facilitates reorganization in the business context and
repayment plans in the consumer context. I 1 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 4, at 6141 (stating that § 506(a) allows bankruptcy court to facilitate business
reorganization and thus protect debtor's interest).
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however, to the extent that the allowed claim exceeds the value of the
property serving as collateral. 3 In responding to debtors' attempts in a
bankruptcy proceeding to void liens under section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code, bankruptcy courts inconsistently have determined whether a debtor
may void a creditor's real property lien to the extent that the lien exceeds
the value of the collateral.
14
Although debtors recently have attempted to retain property of the
bankruptcy estate by voiding liens to the extent that the liens exceed the
fair market value of the property, 5 under state law debtors who wish to
13. See I1 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982) (providing that creditor has unsecured claim to extent
that value of creditor's interest in estate's interest in property is less than amount of allowed
claim).
14. See Worrell v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 67 Bankr. 16, 20 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1986) (holding that § 506(d) permits Chapter Seven debtor to void portion of real estate
mortgage lien to extent that lien exceeded fair market value of real estate); Lindsey v. Federal
Land Bank of St. Louis ( In re Lindsey), 64 Bankr. 19, 24 (Bankr. C.D. II1. 1986) (holding
that § 506(d) allows Chapter Seven debtor to void real property mortgage to extent that
mortgage exceeds value of property); Lyons v. First Pa. Bank ( In re Lyons) 46 Bankr. 604,
607 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. E.D. 1985) (holding that Chapter Seven debtors could use § 506(d) to
void mortgage on principal residence to extent that amount of mortgage exceeds value of
residence); Brace v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 33 Bankr. 91, 95 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio,
W.D. 1983) (holding that because amount of debtors' first mortgage exceeded fair market
value of debtors' real estate, debtors could void under § 506(d) second mortgage that was
totally unsecured claim); Tanner v. FinanceAmerica Consumer Discount Co. ( In re Tanner),
14 Bankr. 933, 939 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that debtor may void real property lien
pursuant to § 506(d) to extent that lien exceeded value of collateral); Walker v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan ( In re Walker), 11 Bankr. 43, 44 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. E.D. 1981) (holding that
second mortgagee had secured lien on debtors' realty to extent that value of realty exceeded
first mortgage, and accordingly, Chapter Thirteen debtors could void under § 506(d) remainder
of second mortgage that was unsecured claim). But see Maitland v. Central Fidelity Bank (
In re Maitland), 61 Bankr. 130, 135 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (holding that Chapter Seven
debtors may not use § 506(d) to void liens against real property to extent that liens exceed
value of property); In re Sloan, 56 Bankr. 726, 726 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (holding that
Chapter Seven debtor may not use § 506(d) to void creditor's lien on residence of debtor);
Cordes v. Geico Fin. Serv., Inc. ( In re Cordes) 37 Bankr. 582, 584 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984)
(holding that Chapter Seven debtors could not void under § 506(d) lien on residence to extent
that lien exceeded amount of creditor's secured claim); In re Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308, 310
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code does not authorize
Chapter Seven debtors to void real property lien that exceeded value of collateral).
15. See Worrell v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 67 Bankr. 16, 17 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1986) (debtors requested that bankruptcy court determine maturity and amount of payment
on secured portion of creditors' claim after bankruptcy court had voided unsecured portion
of creditors' claim); Lindsey v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 64 Bankr. 19, 20 (Bankr.
C.D. Ii. 1986) (debtors petitioned court to value real estate and to determine how, when, and
what amount debtors must pay creditors to retain title to property free of creditors' liens);
Cordes v. Geico Financial Services, Inc., 37 Bankr. 582, 583 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) (debtors
sought to have bankruptcy court declare creditor's claim unsecured in amount that claim
exceeded value of property, have creditor reduce debt to value of property, and pay off secured
claim); In re Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308, 309 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that debtors
wanted bankruptcy court to determine value of debtors' encumbered property and void liens
to extent that liens exceeded value of property so that debtors could pay senior lienholder
value of lien and thus redeem property).
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retain property encumbered with senior and junior mortgages generally must
pay the lienholders the amount outstanding on both the senior and junior
mortgages. 6 Under state law if a debtor with senior and junior mortgages
on his real estate defaults on the mortgage payments, the senior lienholder
7
typically has two options to protect his interest in the debtor's property.'
First, the senior lienholder can foreclose on the debtor's real estate. 19 If the
senior lienholder forecloses and sells the debtor's property to satisfy the
debt, the senior lienholder may recover from the sale proceeds the amount
of the outstanding debt on the senior lien.20 If the property at the foreclosure
sale sells for a price exceeding the value of the senior lien, the junior
lienholder recovers the excess amount to the extent of the value of his lien.2'
In addition to foreclosing on his lien, a senior lienholder may protect
his interest in the debtor's property, second, by bidding in at the foreclosure
sale." Senior lienholders bid in at foreclosure sales primarily when the senior
lienholder believes that the property is worth more than the highest bid at
the foreclosure sale.23 By bidding in at the sale, the senior lienholder offers
to relinquish his lien in exchange for the property.? After buying the
property at the foreclosure sale, the senior lienholder subsequently may sell
the property at a profit to satisfy his interest? If a junior lienholder,
similarly, anticipates that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale will not satisfy
both the senior and junior liens encumbering the property, the junior
16. See In re Carter, 56 F. Supp. 385, 388 (W.D. Va. 1944) (providing that lienholder
has right under state law to have property serve as collateral and to take property if debtor
defaults on mortgage payments); R. KRAvom & R. WERNER, supra note 7, at 389 (stating
that before foreclosure sale, mortgagor may pay off mortgage and redeem property).
17. See R. KRATovrt & R. WERNER, supra note 7, at 372 (explaining that senior mortgage
is first mortgage on property).
18. See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (describing senior lienholder's options
under state law upon debtor's default on mortgage payments).
19. See G. NELSON & D. WmmTaiA, REAL EsTATE FnYAica LAw § 7.6 (2d ed. 1985)
(discussing lienholder's right to foreclose upon mortgagor's default on mortgage payments).
20. Id. at §§ 7.6, 7.14.
21. Id. at § 7.31.
22. R. Ka~xoviL & R. VERNER, supra note 7, at 395; see In re Carter, 56 F. Supp 385,
388 (W.D. Va. 1944) (providing that to protect interests during foreclosure sale of mortgaged
property, creditor may bid at foreclosure sale and may apply amount of debt to bid).
23. G. NELsON & D. WarrmAN, supra note 19, at §§ 7.16, 7.17.
24. See R. KRAvoTm & R. WERNER, supra note 7, at 390 (noting that courts regard
mortgage foreclosure sale as payment of mortgage debt in amount equal to sale price). The
mortgagee typically is the only bidder at the foreclosure sale. Id. at 395. The court allows the
mortgagee, by bidding up to the amount of the mortgage debt and by not producing any
payment, to buy the property. Id. The court does not expect the mortgagee to pay for property
when the mortgagee's bid equals the mortgage debt, because the court would have to pay,
from the foreclosure sale proceeds, the mortgagee for the mortgage debt. Id. If any remaining
debt exists on the mortgage after the court sells the property at the foreclosure sale, the
mortgagee with the unsatisfied debt may seek a deficiency judgment for the remainder of the
debt. Id. at 390.
25. See generally G. NELsoN & D. WmAr, supra note 19, at § 7.17 (explaining that
after foreclosure sale, purchaser has title to property).
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Iienholder may bid in at the foreclosure sale.26 By bidding in at the
foreclosure sale and buying the property, the junior lienholder attempts to
reduce his losses because the junior lienholder can pay off the senior
lienholder and subsequently sell the property at a price exceeding the
purchase price.27 Thus, under state law both senior and junior lienholders
have the right to retain their liens to satisfy the debts.
5 Consequently, a
debtor at state law may not void liens to the extent that the liens exceed
the value of the property, subsequently pay off the senior lien, and thus
retain the property.29 Instead, under state law a debtor who wishes to retain
his property must pay all of the lienholders the value of their liens.
3 0
Although a debtor under state law may not void liens to the extent that
the liens exceed the value of the collateral, some bankruptcy courts have
allowed debtors to void liens to the extent that the liens exceed the value
of the debtor's property.3' In Tanner v. FinanceAmerica Consumer Discount
Co. 32 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania held that a debtor may void pursuant to section 506(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code a real property mortgage to the extent that the mortgage
exceeds the value of the collateral. 33 In Tanner a debtor, Tanner, filed a
26. Id.
27. Id.; See R. KRAvOTiL & R. WERuNE, supra note 7, at 372 (providing that because
foreclosure of senior lien extinguishes junior lien, junior lienholder can prevent extinguishment
of junior lien by paying off senior lien).
28. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text (describing senior and junior lien-
holders' rights under state law to maintain lien to satisfy debt).
29. See generally R. KRAvoTm & R. Wan~-a, supra note 7, at 389-96 (discussing
mortgagee's right to foreclose on debtor's property after debtor defaults on mortgage pay-
ments).
30. Id.
31. See Worrell v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 67 Bankr. 16, 20 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1986) (holding that § 506(d) permits Chapter Seven debtor to void portion of real estate
mortgage lien to extent that lien exceeded fair market value of real estate); Lindsey v. Federal
Land Bank of St. Louis ( In re Lindsey), 64 Bankr. 19, 24 (Bankr. C.D. III. 1986) (holding
that § 506(d) allows Chapter Seven debtor to void real property mortgage to extent that
mortgage exceeds value of property); Lyons v. First Pa. Bank ( In re Lyons) 46 Bankr. 604,
607 (Bankr. N.D. IlI. E.D. 1985) (holding that Chapter Seven debtors could use § 506(d) to
void mortgage on principal residence to extent that amount of mortgage exceeds value of
residence); Brace v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 33 Bankr. 91, 95 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio,
W.D. 1983) (holding that because amount of debtors' first mortgage exceeded fair market
value of debtors' real estate, debtors could void under § 506(d) second mortgage that was
totally unsecured claim); Tanner v. FinanceAmerica Consumer Discount Co. ( In re Tanner),
14 Bankr. 933, 939 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that debtor may void real property lien
pursuant to § 506(d) to extent that lien exceeded value of collateral); Walker v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan ( In re Walker), 11 Bankr. 43, 44 (Bankr. N.D. Ill., E.D. 1981) (holding that
second mortgagee had secured lien on debtors' realty to extent that value of realty exceeded
first mortgage, and accordingly, Chapter Thirteen debtors could void under § 506(d) remainder
of second mortgage that was unsecured claim).
32. 14 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981).
33. Tanner v. FinanceAmerica Consumer Discount Co., 14 Bankr. 933, 937 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1981).
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voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter Seven34 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 35 Tanner's home had a fair market value of twenty thousand dollars,
but three mortgages encumbered the home.3 6 The defendant, Finance-
America, owned the junior mortgage on Tanner's home. 37 The balances on
the senior mortgages totaled $23,980 and thus exceeded the fair market
value of the debtor's home. 3 The debtor petitioned the court to declare the
third mortgage unsecured under section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and,
consequently, void pursuant to section 506(d).3 9 The junior lienholder,
however, contended that the Bankruptcy Code explicitly does not authorize
the debtor to void the defendant's mortgage lien. 4°
Disagreeing with the junior lienholder, the Tanner court held that section
506(d) authorized the debtor to void the real property mortgage to the
extent that the mortgage exceeded the value of the collateral.4' The Tanner
court advanced four justifications for allowing a debtor to void a lien to
the extent that the lien exceeded the value of the collateral.4 2 The bankruptcy
court considered, first, the language of section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code. 43 In examining the language of section 506(d), the Tanner court noted
that Congress broadly defined the term "lien" in section 101(33) of the
Bankruptcy Code as an interest in property to secure payment of a debt."
The Tanner court reasoned that Congress would not define the term "lien"
broadly in section 101(33) but narrowly construe the term "lien" in section
506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to exclude real property mortgages.4 5 The
Tanner court concluded, therefore, that the term "lien" in section 506(d)
34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982); see supra note 3 (explaining liquidation proceeding
under Chapter Seven of Bankruptcy Code).
35. Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 934.
36. Id. at 935. In Tanner the debtor alleged that her home had a fair market value of
$20,000. Id. at 934. After hearing evidence relating to the value of the debtor's home, the





41. Id. at 939.
42. Id. at 935-39; see infra notes 43-65 and accompanying text (listing Tanner court's
justifications for allowing debtor to void real property mortgage that exceeded value of
property serving as collateral).
43. Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 935; see supra note 11 (language of § 506(d)).
44. Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 935; 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see S. REP.
No. 989, supra note 1, at 5811 (providing that Congress broadly defined term "lien" as charge
against or interest in property to secure payment of debt or performance of obligation). The
Bankruptcy Code identifies three types of liens. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(32), (45), (47) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986). First, a debtor and creditor may create a lien by agreement. Id. § 101(45). Liens
created by agreement, which the Bankruptcy Code labels security agreements, include real
property mortgages. Id. § 101(45); S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5812. Second, a judicial
lien is a lien that a creditor obtains by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable
proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Third, a statutory lien is a lien that
arises solely by force of statute on the occurrence of specified circumstances. Id. § 101(47).
45. Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 935.
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of the Bankruptcy Code included real property mortgages. 46 The Tanner
court noted, additionally, that when Congress desired to provide special
treatment for a real property mortgage, Congress clearly indicated its
intent. 47
After considering the plain meaning of the language in section 506(d),
the Tanner court examined, second, whether by interpreting the term "lien"
in section 506(d) to include real property mortgages, courts consistently
would promote the overall purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.4s The Tanner
court reasoned, specifically, that by allowing a debtor to void a real property
mortgage to the extent that the mortgage exceeds the value of the collateral,
the court would promote the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code.
49
The Tanner court recognized that a fresh start grants a debtor a discharge
from debts and provides the debtor with a new financial start.5 0 The Tanner
court stated that a new financial start should permit the property that a
debtor acquires after filing for bankruptcy not to be subject to claims of
prebankruptcy creditors.51 The Tanner court reasoned, accordingly, that by
partaking in the profits of the debtor's postbankruptcy property acquisitions,
a prebankruptcy creditor maintaining a mortgage that is an undersecured
claim will impair the debtor's fresh start.
5 2
In addition to reasoning that a broad interpretation of the term "lien"
would promote the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code, the Tanner
court reasoned, third, that section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a
creditor to receive in bankruptcy the same property value that the creditor
would receive under state law.53 The Tanner court reasoned, specifically,
that under section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code, creditors should receive
through the valuation procedure in bankruptcy the same, property value that
the creditors would receive under state law in a forced sale of the debtor's
nonexempt property.5 4 The bankruptcy court recognized that under state
law the senior lienholder typically would foreclose on the debtor's property,
receive less than fair market value of the property at the forced sale, and
leave the junior lienholder with an unsatisfied claim.55 The Tanner court
46. Id. at 936.
47. Id. To illustrate congressional intent to provide special treatment for real property
security interests, the Tanner court cited section 1322(b)(2), which permits a debtor in a Chapter
Thirteen plan to modify the rights of the holders of secured and unsecured claims, except
claims secured by real property mortgages. Id. at 935; 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
48. Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 936.
49. Id.; see supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing fresh start policy of
Bankruptcy Code).
50. Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 936.
51. Id. The Tanner court characterized both appreciation of property and an increase
of equity ownership by the reduction of an outstanding mortgage as examples of property that
a debtor acquires after bankruptcy. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 936-37.
54. Id. at 937.
55. Id.
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recognized, further, that the purchaser of the debtor's property at the
foreclosure sale would receive the property unencumbered.56 The Tanner
court reasoned, therefore, that in failing to void a lien that exceeds the
value of the collateral, the court would benefit the lienholder more in a
bankruptcy proceeding than in a state law foreclosure sale.5 7 The Tanner
court concluded, accordingly, that by allowing a lienholder a greater benefit
in a bankruptcy proceeding than under state law, the court would frustrate
Congress' intent to provide debtors with relief under the Bankruptcy Code.5 8
The Tanner court addressed, finally, the constitutionality of section
506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.5 9 The Tanner court initially found that
section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a court to
unconstitutionally abridge a lienholder's due process rights under the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 60 In finding that a court by
voiding liens, does not unconstitutionally abridge a lienholder's due process
rights, the Tanner court noted that the lienholder's completely unsecured 6l
claim is an "empty legal right," rather than a valuable property right.62
The Tanner court reasoned, therefore, that in voiding a mortgage that
exceeds the value of the collateral, the court would not unconstitutionally
deprive a lienholder of property. 63 The bankruptcy court reasoned, further,
that at a state law foreclosure sale a completely unsecured mortgagee would
lose his lien. 64 The Tanner court concluded, accordingly, that because the
court was permitting the result that would occur under state law, section
506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code constitutionally allows a bankruptcy court




58. Id. In addition to interpreting the statutory language and examining the legislative
history of section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Tanner court used case precedent to
support its ruling that section 506(d) applies to real property mortgages. See id. at 937-38
(examining case law interpretation of § 506(d)); see also Geiger v. Geiger, 12 Bankr. 410, 411
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981) (holding that § 506(d) authorizes debtor to void real property
mortgages); Pitre v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 11 Bankr. 777, 781 (Bankr. E.D.N.D.
Ill. 1981) (stating that Congress intended § 506(d) to prevent creditor with lien exceeding value
of collateral from realizing future benefits as result of property appreciating in value or as
result of debtor making payments on senior claims secured by same property); Walker v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan, 11 Bankr. 43, 44 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. E.D. 1981) (voiding, under § 506(d)
second mortgage to extent that second mortgage exceeded value of collateral); In re Hotel
Associates, 3 Bankr. 340, 342 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that if court disallows claim,
then lien is void under § 506(d) to extent that court disallows claim).
59. Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 938-39.
60. Id.; U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982) (providing that creditor has secured claim to extent
of value of collateral and unsecured claim for balance of claim). A completely unsecured claim
is a claim that totally exceeds the value of the collateral. Id.






Although the Tanner court permitted a debtor to use section 506(d) of
the Bankruptcy Code to void a real property lien to the extent that the lien
exceeds the value of the collateral, some bankruptcy courts have not
permitted a debtor to use section 506(d) to void liens to the extent that the
liens exceed the value of the collateral.6 For example, in In re Mahaner67
debtors owned real estate having a fair market value of $87,500.68 Lincoln
Trust Bank, however, held a first mortgage on the property for $41,646.82.69
Additionally, Marine Bank (Marine) owned second and third mortgages
totalling eighty thousand dollars. 70 After the debtors filed a Chapter Seven
petition, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
New York granted the debtors a stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code, which prevented the creditors from collecting their claims or from
enforcing their liens.7' To redeem the debtors' property to the extent of
Marine's lien, the debtors sought a continuation of the stay so that the
court could determine, first, whether the real estate was secured property
under section 506(a) and, second, whether Marine had a secured claim on
the real estate to the extent of their lien.
72
The Mahaner court held that the debtors could not use section 506(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code to void a real property lien to the extent that the
lien exceeds the value of the collateral.7 1 In holding that the debtor may
not use section 506(d) to void a real property lien, the Mahaner court
reasoned, first, that by allowing a debtor to void a real property lien under
section 506(d), the court would render meaningless section 722 of the
Bankruptcy Code.74 The Mahaner court explained that section 722 of the
Bankruptcy Code authorizes a debtor to pay a lienholder the value of the
encumbered property and thus redeem personal property from a lien. 7 The
bankruptcy court noted, however, that under section 722 a debtor may
redeem only personal property, not real property.76 The Mahaner court
66. See supra note 14 (listing courts that allow and disallow debtors' use of § 506(d) to
void real property lien that exceeds value of collateral).
67. 34 Bankr. 308 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983).
68. In re Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308, 308 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983).
69. Id. at 309.
70. Id.
71. See id. (stating that debtors sought continuation of automatic stay); 11 U.S.C. § 362
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (automatic stay provision); supra note 7 (describing automatic stay).
72. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309; see 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1982) (redemption provision).
Section 722 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to pay lienholders the amount of the
allowed claim and thus redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for personal,
family, or household use. I1 U.S.C. § 722 (1982); see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 6088
(stating that § 722 allows debtor to retain necessary property and to avoid high replacement
costs).
73. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309.
74. Id.
75. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1982); see supra note 72 (explaining § 722 redemption provision
of Bankruptcy Code).
76. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309; see 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1982) (providing that debtor may
redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family, or household use).
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reasoned, accordingly, that by allowing a Chapter Seven debtor to redeem
under section 506(d) real property that the debtor could not redeem under
section 722, a court would render section 722 of the Bankruptcy Code
meaningless.
77
After reasoning that a bankruptcy court should not allow a debtor to
use section 506(d) to redeem real property in a liquidation proceeding, the
Mahaner court reasoned, second, that by allowing a debtor to obtain in the
liquidation 78 proceeding more property than a debtor could obtain in the
rehabilitative79 proceedings, the court would promote an unsound policy of
discouraging debtors from using the rehabilitative chapters of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.80 The Mahaner court recognized that although Congress in-
tended for debtors to use the rehabilitative chapters of the Bankruptcy Code
to repay unsecured creditors, the liquidation chapter of the Bankruptcy
Code provides unsecured creditors with little or no satisfaction of their
claims.8' The Mahaner court found, also, that the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code strongly encourages repayment plans, rather than liqui-
dation procedures.8 2 The Mahaner court reasoned, accordingly, that Con-
gress likely would not intend a debtor in a liquidation proceeding to use
section 506(d) to void liens that a debtor in a rehabilitative proceeding could
not void."3 The Mahaner court noted that instead of allowing a debtor to
use section 506(d) to void liens, Congress intended a trustee administering
the debtor's bankruptcy estate to use section 506(d) to sell the collateral
and to extinguish the entire lien even though the sale fully would not satisfy
the debt.84
After reasoning that Congress likely would not intend debtors in a
liquidation proceeding to use section 506(d) to void liens that a debtor could
not void in a rehabilitative proceeding, the Mahaner court reasoned, finally,
that an interpretation of section 506(d) that allows courts to void liens in
excess of the value of the collateral constitutes an unconstitutional taking
of property without adequate compensation to the creditors. 5 Initially, the
Mahaner court defined the term "mortgage" as a property interest.8 6 The
77. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309. The Mahaner court stated that in recognizing section
722 as the exclusive Chapter Seven redemption provision, the court would not render section
506 meaningless because section 506 applies to the rehabilitative chapters regarding the treatment
of secured claims. Id. The bankruptcy court noted, further, that section 506 applies to both
the liquidation and rehabilitative chapters when a trustee sells the property. Id.; see supra note
3 (describing liquidation and rehabilitative chapters of Bankruptcy Code).
78. See supra note 3 (describing liquidation chapter of Bankruptcy Code).
79. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309.
80. Id.
81. Id. See generally S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5878-925 (legislative history of
liquidation chapter and rehabilitative chapters of Bankruptcy Code).
82. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309. See generally S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5878-
929 (legislative history of liquidation chapter and rehabilitative chapters of Bankruptcy Code).
83. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309.
84. Id.




Mahaner court noted that a mortgagee has a right under state law to realize
upon the collateral, which is the property that the debtor uses to secure the
mortgage.8 7 The bankruptcy court noted that a mortgagee often recognizes
that his mortgage may be more valuable than the market value of the
collateral at a given time."8 The Mahaner court reasoned, therefore, that a
mortgagee anticipating that the defaulting mortgagor's property may appre-
ciate in value may choose not to foreclose immediately. s9 The Mahaner
court concluded that by voiding a real property lien that exceeds the value
of the collateral, a court deprives the mortgagee of the right to foreclose
on property that may appreciate in value.90 The Mahaner court reasoned,
thus, that a mortgagee who forecloses on collateral before the debtor-
mortgagor files a petition in bankruptcy may purchase the property at the
foreclosure sale and, consequently, benefit from the appreciated property. 91
The Mahaner court concluded, accordingly, that by voiding a lien that
exceeds the value of the collateral, a court unconstitutionally deprives the
mortgagee of the right to maintain the mortgage to enjoy the benefits of
appreciated property.Y The Mahaner court, consequently, granted Marine's
motion to lift the stay to allow Marine to begin foreclosure proceedings
under state law.9
In determining whether section 506(d) allows a debtor to void a real
property lien that exceeds the value of the collateral, the Tanner reasoning
is unsatisfactory for four reasons. 94 First, in its statutory interpretation of
section 506(d), the Tanner rationale places too much emphasis on the term
"lien," rather than on the term "void." 95s Second, the Tanner reasoning
falls to examine thoroughly the legislative history of section 506(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code.96 Third, the Tanner rationale fails to acknowledge that
by allowing a debtor to void a real property lien that exceeds the value of
the collateral, a court would deprive junior lienholders in bankruptcy
87. Id. The Mahaner court explained that a mortgagee has a number of years after the
mortgagor defaults on the mortgage payments to begin a foreclosure proceeding. Id.; see
Boyarsky v. Froccaro, 125 Misc. 2d 352, 479 N.Y.S.2d. 606, 612 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (providing
that mortgage stands for debt or obligation to be secured, due from mortgagor to mortgagee,
right to foreclose, and reciprocal right to redeem).





93. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 310.
94. See infra notes 95-125 and accompanying text (discussing reasons that Tanner
justifications for holding that debtor may void lien under § 506(d) are unsatisfactory); supra
notes 32-65 and accompanying text (discussing Tanner).
95. See infra notes 99-107 (explaining reasons that Tanner's statutory interpretation
argument is misguided); supra notes 43-47 (explaining Tanner's statutory interpretation anal-
ysis).
96. See infra notes 108-15 and accompanying text (explaining that Tanner court failed
to explore thoroughly legislative history of § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code); supra notes 48-52
(discussing Tanner court's examination of legislative history to § 506(d)).
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proceedings of the potential benefits of appreciated property from which
the junior lienholder could benefit under state law. 97 Finally, the Tanner
rationale fails to recognize that by allowing a debtor to void a real property
lien that exceeds the value of the collateral, a court may be unconstitutionally
depriving the junior lienholder of property.98
The Tanner rationale is unsatisfactory, first, because in its interpretation
of section 506(d), the Tanner rationale places too much emphasis on the
term "lien," rather than on the term "void." 99 The term "lien" is not the
critical word in section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.1°° An interpretation
solely of the meaning of the term "lien" does not clarify the meaning of
section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. 0 1 Although the Tanner rationale
may interpret correctly the term "lien" as including real property mortgages,
the Tanner rationale fails to inquire into the meaning that Congress intended
for the critical term "void. '' 02 By focusing its interpretation of section
506(d) on the term "lien," the Tanner rationale mistakenly assumes that
the term "void" in section 506(d) is unambiguous. 03 Courts, however, have
interpreted the term "void" in different ways. 104 Some courts have stated
that Congress intended the term "void" in section 506(d) to permit a trustee
to sell the collateral and extinguish the entire lien even though the sale
proceeds fully do not satisfy the debt.'0 5 Another court has stated that
Congress intended the term "void" in section 506(d) to permit valid liens
to survive the bankruptcy proceeding.? 6 Because of the ambiguity of the
97. See infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (describing how Tanner reasoning
deprives junior lienholders in bankruptcy proceeding of potential benefits of appreciated
property); supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (explaining Tanner court's argument that
in bankruptcy proceeding, junior lienholder receives same value for property that junior
lienholder would receive under state law).
98. See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text (describing how Tanner reasoning may
unconstitutionally deprive junior lienholder of property); supra notes 59-65 (discussing Tanner
court's constitutional analysis of whether court may void lien under § 506(d) to extent that
lien exceeds value of collateral).
99. See Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 935 (interpreting § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code).
100. See id. (focusing on term "lien"); infra notes 101-107 and accompanying text
(explaining Tanner court's error in focusing on term "lien").
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing that to extent that lien
secures claim against debtor that is not allowed secured claim, lien is void).
102. See Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 935 (interpreting § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code); 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing that to extent that lien secures claim against
debtor that is not allowed secured claim, lien is void).
103. See Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 935 (interpreting § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code); infra notes
104-06 and accompanying text (discussing various interpretations of term "void" in § 506(d)).
104. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (listing courts' differing interpretations
of term "void" in § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code).
105. In re Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 308, 309 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983); see Maitland v.
Central Fidelity Bank, 61 Bankr. 130, 134 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (following Mahaner court's
interpretation of § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code).
106. See In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464, 466 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that § 506(d) of
Bankruptcy Code allows valid liens to survive bankruptcy proceeding). The Tarnow court
stated that section 506(d) allows a bankruptcy court to void liens that are not valid secured
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term "void" in section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Tanner reason-
ing's failure to interpret the vital term "void" weakens the Tanner analy-
sis.1
07
In addition to assuming that the term "void" in section 506(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code is unambiguous, the Tanner reasoning, second, fails to
explore thoroughly the legislative history of section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code.101 Although the Tanner reasoning understandably interprets section
506(d) as being consistent with the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy
Code, the legislative history of section 506(d) specifically does not indicate
that Congress intended for debtors to use section 506(d) to void real property
liens to gain a fresh start. °9 The legislative history of section 506(d) suggests,
instead, that Congress included the term "void" in section 506(d) to ensure
that valid security interests survive the bankruptcy proceeding." 0 One court
has noted that section 506(d) appears literally to provide that if a party
requests that a bankruptcy court disallow a claim, and the bankruptcy court
does disallow the claim, then the lien that secures the claim is void."' This
court noted, further, that Congress enacted section 506(d) to permit valid
liens to survive the bankruptcy proceeding.' 2 By allowing the debtor in a
bankruptcy proceeding to void a valid lien, however, the Tanner reasoning
unfairly gives the debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding a windfall that the
debtor would not receive under state law. 3 Although the Tanner rationale
does provide the debtor with a fresh start, the Tanner rationale provides
little indication that Congress intended section 506(d) specifically to effec-
tuate a debtor's fresh start."
4
claims. Id. at 466. The Tarnow court explained that if a creditor does not have a valid secured
claim, then the creditor does not have a valid lien, which is security for the claim. Id.
107. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text (explaining that by failing to interpret
ambiguous term "void" in § 506(d), Tanner court unsatisfactorily analyzed § 506(d) of
Bankruptcy Code).
108. See Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 933, 936 (discussing legislative history of § 506(d) of
Bankruptcy Code); supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (discussing Tanner court's
interpretation of § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code); infra notes 109-14 (discussing Tanner court's
failure to explore thoroughly legislative history of § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code).
109. See Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 936 (discussing interpretation of legislative history of §
506(d) of Bankruptcy Code); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 6313. (outlining legislative
history of § 506(d) and failing to provide specifically that purpose of § 506(d) is to grant
debtor fresh start); supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing fresh start policy of
Bankruptcy Code).
110. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 6313. The legislative history of section 506(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code reveals that section 506(d) permits liens to survive the bankruptcy
case. Id. The legislative history also reveals that if a party in interest requests the court to
determine and allow or disallow the claim secured by the lien and if the court .disallows the
claim, then the lien is void to the extent that the claim is not allowed. Id.
111. See In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464, 466 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that § 506(d) of
Bankruptcy Code allows valid liens to survive bankruptcy proceeding).
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 15-30 and accompanying text (explaining that under state law debtor
may not void lien to extent that lien exceeds value of collateral).
114. See Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 936. (discussing interpretation of legislative history of
506(d) of Bankruptcy Code and emphasis on fresh start policy).
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In addition to questionably assuming that Congress intended for section
506(d) to provide the debtor with a fresh start, the Tanner reasoning, third,
deprives junior lienholders in bankruptcy proceedings of the potential ben-
efits of appreciated property that the junior lienholder could receive under
state law.1"5 In concluding that section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code allows
lienholders to receive in a bankruptcy proceeding the same property value
that the lienholders would receive at a state law foreclosure sale, the Tanner
reasoning assumes that the property at a forced sale would sell for the same
price that the bankruptcy court finds the property to be worth." 6 At a state
law foreclosure sale, however, the property may have appreciated in value,
a bidder may purchase the propery at a price exceeding the bankruptcy
court's value of the property, and the proceeds from the sale may satisfy
partially or fully the junior lienholder's lien." 7 Although property at a
foreclosure sale generally sells for a price lower than fair market value, a
bidder still may purchase the property at the foreclosure sale at a price
exceeding the value that the bankruptcy court attached to the property." 8
Accordingly, the Tanner reasoning that section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code
allows lienholders to receive in a bankruptcy proceeding the same property
value that the lienholders would receive under state law is questionable., 9
In addition to assuming that a junior lienholder at a foreclosure sale
would not receive partial payment of his lien, the Tanner reasoning, finally,
questionably concludes that by voiding a lien that exceeds the value of the
collateral, a court is not unconstitutionally depriving a junior lienholder of
property. 20 Some courts, however, have acknowledged that a lienholder has
115. See id. 14 Bankr. at 936-37 (stating that § 506 of Bankruptcy Code allows creditors
to receive in bankruptcy same property value that creditors receive at state law foreclosure
sale). But see In re Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308, 310 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that by
voiding under § 506(d) lien to extent that lien exceeds value of collateral, bankruptcy court
deprives lienholder of opportunity to buy at forced sale property that may have appreciated
in value); infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (explaining weakness of Tanner court's
claim that § 506 allows creditors to receive in bankruptcy same property value that creditors
would receive in forced sale of property under state law).
116. See Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 936-37 (stating that § 506 of Bankruptcy Code allows
creditors to receive in bankruptcy proceeding same property value that creditors would receive
at state law foreclosure sale).
117. See In re Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308, 310 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that
lienholder who forecloses may bid for property, buy property, and benefit if property has
appreciated in value). See generally G. NiLsoN & D. Wmrrrs",e supra note 19, at §§ 7.6-32
(discussing state law foreclosure sales).
118. See generally G. NEtsoN & D. WirmAN, supra note 19, at § 7.17 (discussing
procedure of bidding at foreclosure sales); cf. In re Endlich, 47 Bankr. 802, 804 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that real property increased in value since appraisal two years ago).
119. See Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 936-37 (reasoning that § 506 allows bankruptcy court to
give creditor in bankruptcy proceeding same property value that creditor would receive at state
law foreclosure sale); supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (suggesting that Tanner
rationale questionably assumes that § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code permits lienholders to receive
in bankruptcy same property value that lienbolder would receive at state law foreclosure sale).
120. See Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 938 (discussing constitutionality of § 506(d) of Bankruptcy
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a right to maintain his lien to satisfy the debt.12 ' By voiding in a bankruptcy
proceeding a lien to the extent that the lien exceeds the value of the
property, a bankruptcy court deprives the junior lienholder of the chance
to maintain the lien to satisfy the debt.122 The property may have appreciated
in value to such an extent that at a foreclosure sale a junior lienholder
could receive partial or full payment of his lien.123 Similarly, a junior
lienholder may wish to bid in at the foreclosure sale, offer the value of his
lien for the purchase price of the property, buy the property, and sell the
property at a profit.' 24 Consequently, the Tanner reasoning questionably
concludes that by voiding a lien, a bankruptcy court is not unconstitutionally
depriving a lienholder of property.' 25
While the Tanner reasoning has several weaknesses, the Mahaner rea-
soning has a number of strengths.12 First, rather than focusing solely on
the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code, the Mahaner reasoning
examines whether Congress intended for a debtor to redeem under section
506(d) real property that a debtor could not redeem under the liquidation
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 27 Second, by not allowing a debtor to
void liens and receive in a liquidation proceeding more property than a
debtor would receive in a rehabilitative proceeding, the Mahaner reasoning
Code); see also In re Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308, 310 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that by
voiding liens to extent that liens exceed value of collateral, bankruptcy court may unconsti-
tutionally deprive junior lienholder of benefits of appreciated property); infra notes 121-25
and accompanying text (discussing reasons that Tanner court questionably concludes that by
voiding liens under § 506(d), bankruptcy court does not unconstitutionally deprive lienholder
of property).
121. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 580 (1935) (stating
that essence of mortgage is right of mortgagee to insist upon full payment before mortgagee
relinquishes security); In re Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308, 310 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating
that by voiding lien to extent that lien exceeds value of property, bankruptcy court may
unconstitutionally deprive junior lienholder of property).
122. In re Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308, 310 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983); see supra notes 16-30
and accompanying text (discussing lienholder's rights under state law to maintain lien to satisfy
debt).
123. See Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 310 (discussing lienholder's rights under state law
foreclosure sale); supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text (discussing lienholder's right under
state law to maintain lien to satisfy debt).
124. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 580 (1935) (providing
that to protect right to full payment of mortgaged property, mortgagee allowed to bid at
foreclosure sale).
125. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (discussing reasons that Tanner court
questionably reasons that by voiding lien under § 506(d), bankruptcy court does not uncon-
stitutionally deprive lienholder of property).
126. Compare supra notes 94-125 and accompanying text (discussing weaknesses of Tanner
reasoning) with infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text (discussing strengths of Mahaner
reasoning).
127. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (explaining Mahaner court reasoning
that Congress did not intend for debtor to use § 506(d) to redeem real property that debtor
could not redeem under liquidation provisions of Bankruptcy Code); infra notes 130-36 and
accompanying text (explaining that Mahaner court correctly avoids focusing on whether debtor's
ability to void liens is consistent with fresh start policy).
19881 1409
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1393
discourages debtors from perceiving that liquidation is better than rehabil-
itation.128 Finally, the Mahaner reasoning promotes results that most closely
approximate state law results and, consequently, preserves in a bankruptcy
proceeding a creditor's rights under state law.129
The Mahaner reasoning, first, correctly avoids focusing on whether a
debtor's ability to void liens under section 506(d) promotes the fresh start
policy of the Bankruptcy Code. 30 By not focusing on the fresh start policy,
the Mahaner reasoning recognizes that the legislative history does not
indicate that Congress intended for section 506(d) to further the fresh start
policy of the Bankruptcy Code.' 3' The Mahaner reasoning, instead, recog-
nizes that the debtors voiding junior liens intend to pay senior lienholders
the value of the lien and thus redeem their property.'3 2 By recognizing that
debtors intend to use section 506(d) to redeem their property, the Mahaner
reasoning correctly examines specific liquidation provisions to discern whether
Congress intended for a debtor to redeem real property in a liquidation
proceeding. 3  The Mahaner reasoning convincingly explains that because
section 722 of the Bankruptcy Code does not allow a debtor in a liquidation
proceeding to redeem real property, a court should not allow a debtor in a
liquidation proceeding to use section 506(d) to redeem property. 3 4 The
Mahaner reasoning recognizes, accordingly, that although the fresh start
policy is one general policy of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress did not
intend for every section of the Bankruptcy Code to further the fresh start
policy.3 5 The Mahaner reasoning, thus, follows a specific statutory section
128. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (explaining Mahaner rationale that
courts should not allow debtor to receive in liquidation proceeding more property than debtor
would receive in rehabilitative proceeding); infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (explaining
that Mahaner court convincingly reasons that by allowing debtors to receive more property in
liquidation proceeding than in rehabilitative proceeding, court would encourage debtors to
liquidate, rather than rehabilitate).
129. See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text (outlining Mahaner court's reasoning
that debtor may not void under § 506(d) lien to extent that lien exceeds value of property);
infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (describing ways that Mahaner reasoning preserves
in bankruptcy proceeding creditors' rights under state law).
130. See Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309 (avoiding analysis of § 506(d) in terms of fresh start
policy of Bankruptcy Code); supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing Mahaner
reasoning that because debtor may not redeem real property under § 722 of Bankruptcy Code,
debtor should not be able to redeem real property under § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code).
131. See Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309 (avoiding analysis of § 506(d) in terms of fresh start
policy of Bankruptcy Code); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 6316 (providing legislative
history of § 506(d) and falling to state that purpose of § 506(d) is to give debtors fresh start).
132. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309.
133. See id. (noting that debtor may not redeem real property under § 722 of Bankruptcy
Code).
134. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1982); see Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309 (stating that debtor should
not receive in liquidation proceeding more property than debtor would receive in rehabilitative
proceeding); supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing Mahaner reasoning that by
allowing debtor to void real property lien under § 506(d), court would render meaningless §
722 of Bankruptcy Code).
135. See Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309 (examining redemption policy of § 722 of Bankruptcy
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of the Bankruptcy Code that does not allow a debtor to redeem real
property in a liquidation proceeding, over the more general fresh start
policy.1
36
After reasoning that a bankruptcy court should not allow debtors to
use section 506(d) to redeem real property in a liquidation proceeding, the
Mahaner rationale, second, convincingly explains that Congress did not
intend a debtor to receive in a liquidation proceeding more property than
the debtor could receive in a rehabilitative proceeding. 37 Examining the
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, the Mahaner reasoning correctly
recognizes that Congress intended to encourage debtors who are eligible for
a rehabilitation plan to use a rehabilitation plan.' 38 A debtor who could
redeem real estate in a liquidation proceeding likely would not use the
rehabilitative proceedings. 3 9 The Mahaner reasoning concludes that by al-
lowing a debtor to void liens and to redeem real estate in a liquidation
proceeding, courts would frustrate Congress' intent to encourage debtors to
use the rehabilitative chapters. 4' Accordingly, the Mahaner reasoning con-
vincingly examines the use of section 506(d) in conjunction with policies of
the Bankruptcy Code other than solely the fresh start policy.'
4'
In addition to examining the relation between section 506(d) and the
rehabilitative chapters, the Mahaner reasoning, finally, promotes results that
most closely approximate state law results. 42 One court has noted that, in
deciding whether a debtor can void a lien in a bankruptcy proceeding,
courts should examine whether the debtor could void the lienholder's interest
under state law. 43 One commentator has noted, also, that bankruptcy should
Code, which does not allow debtor to redeem real property in bankruptcy proceeding); supra
notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing redemption policy of § 722, which does not
allow debtor to redeem real property in liquidation chapter of Bankruptcy Code).
136. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309; supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text (discussing
Mahaner reasoning that because § 722 of Bankruptcy Code does not allow debtor in liquidation
proceeding to redeem real property, bankruptcy courts should not allow debtor in liquidation
proceeding to use § 506(d) to redeem real property).
137. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309.
138. Id. See generally S. REp. No. 989, supra note 1, at 5795-99 (summarizing congressional
intent in enacting rehabilitative sections of Bankruptcy Code).
139. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309.
140. Id.
141. See id. (examining rehabilitative policies of Chapter Eleven and Chapter Thirteen of
Bankruptcy Code instead of fresh start policy to determine whether bankruptcy courts should
allow debtor to use § 506(d) to void real property lien to extent that lien exceeds value of
collateral).
142. See id. at 309-10 (discussing reason that courts should not allow debtor to void
under § 506(d) liens to extent that liens exceed value of collateral); infra notes 143-47 (explaining
that Mahaner reasoning preserves in bankruptcy proceeding creditors' rights under state law);
supra notes 16-30 (describing lienholder's rights under state law foreclosure sale).
143. Lyons v. First Pa. Bank, 46 Bankr. 604, 606 (Bankr. N.D. IlI., E.D. 1985) (ac-
knowledging that in deciding whether debtor may void lien in bankruptcy proceeding, courts
should examine whether debtor has power under state law to void lien).
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not alter creditors' rights under, state law. 44 For example, if under state
law, a lienholder may retain his lien until the debtor satisfies the debt, a
lienholder in a bankruptcy proceeding similarly should retain his lien.' 45 The
commentator has noted, thus, that because bankruptcy is a proceeding that
supplies a collective forum for creditors to divide a debtor's assets, bank-
ruptcy should take state law rights, such as preservation of a lienholder's
lien, and translate those rights into the collective forum. 146 The Mahaner
reasoning promotes fair results for both debtors and creditors because the
Mahaner reasoning, accordingly, takes both debtors' and creditors' rights
at state law and translates those rights into a bankruptcy proceeding. 47
Both the Tanner court and. the Mahaner court recognize that the
legislative history to section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code is sparse.' 4 The
Tanner and Mahaner rationales, however, differently examine whether a
bankruptcy court may void under section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code a
lien to the extent that the lien exceeds the value of the collateral. 49 The
Tanner rationale relies mainly on the plain language and a literal interpre-
tation of section 506(d) to support a bankruptcy court's voiding of a lien
to the extent that the lien exceeds the value of the collateral. 50 In contrast,
the Mahaner rationale relies mainly on policy arguments to support a
bankruptcy court's refusal to void a lien to the extent that the lien exceeds
the value of the collateral.' Until Congress clarifies whether a debtor may
use section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to void liens to the extent that
the liens exceed the fair market value of the collateral, bankruptcy courts
should follow the Mahaner analysis.5 2 The Mahaner reasoning benefits
creditors by preserving the creditors' rights available under state law in the
144. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain,
91 YALE L.J. 857-907 (1982) (discussing reasons that bankruptcy law should recognize in
bankruptcy proceedings creditors' rights under state law, such as security interests).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text (discussing Mahaner rationale for not
allowing debtor to void under § 506(d) lien to extent that lien exceeds value of collateral).
148. See Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309 (discussing meaning of § 506(d)); Tanner, 14 Bankr.
at 936 (discussing legislative history of § 506(d)); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 6313
(outlining legislative history of § 506(d)).
149. See Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309-10 (examining reasons for not allowing debtor to
void under § 506(d) of Bankruptcy Code lien to extent that lien exceeds value of collateral);
Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 935-40 (examining reasons for allowing debtor to void under § 506(d)
lien to extent that lien exceeds value of property).
150. Tanner, 14 Bankr. at 935; see supra notes 41-65 (discussing reasons that Tanner
court held that debtor may use § 506(d) to void real property lien to extent that lien exceeds
value of collateral).
151. Mahaner, 34 Bankr. at 309-10; see supra notes 74-93 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing reasons that bankruptcy courts should not allow debtors to use § 506(d) to void real
property lien to extent that lien exceeds value of collateral).
152. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why bankruptcy
courts should adopt Mahaner reasoning); supra notes 127-47 and accompanying text (discussing
strengths of Mahaner reasoning).
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bankruptcy proceeding.'53 Moreover, the Mahaner reasoning furthers the
Bankruptcy Code's goal of equitably distributing among creditors a debtor's
assets. 154 Courts should not follow the Tanner reasoning because the Tanner
reasoning provides debtors with a windfall that the debtor ordinarily would
not receive under state law.
55
In light of the difficulty of discerning congressional intent in enacting
section 506(d), one practical solution is for bankruptcy courts to decline to
value under section 506(a), and decline to subsequently void under section
506(d), the encumbered property of the bankruptcy estate. 156 Instead, because
the encumbered property is of inconsequential value to the bankruptcy
estate, bankruptcy courts should order the trustee to abandon'5 7 the encum-
bered property. 58 When the trustee abandons the encumbered property, the
trustee releases the property to the debtor and the property ceases to be
property of the bankruptcy estate. 159 If the debtor then petitions the bank-
ruptcy court to void under section 506(d) the junior lien, the bankruptcy
court should permit the junior lienholder to submit to the bankruptcy court
a bid to buy the property.1?6 By allowing the junior lienholder to buy the
property, the bankruptcy court provides the junior lienholder with an
opportunity to protect his interest in the property.16' If the junior lienholder
believes that the property's value exceeds the amount of the senior lien, the
junior lienholder typically would buy the property. 62 If the junior lienholder
buys the property, the senior lienholder would receive payment of the senior
lien from the proceeds of the sale. 163 If the junior lienholder declines to
buy the property, however, the bankruptcy court should void under section
506(d) the junior lien. 1' 4 The senior lienholder, who still retains his lien on
153. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (outlining ways that Mahaner reasoning
preserves in bankruptcy proceeding creditors' rights under state law).
154. See supra notes 67-92 and accompanying text (presenting Mahaner rationale for not
allowing debtor to void lien to extent that lien exceeds value of collateral).
155. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text (describing reasons that Tanner
rationale provides debtor with windfall that debtor would not receive at state law).
156. Interviews with Joseph Ulrich, Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law,
in Lexington, Va. (Jan.-Apr. 1988). Professor Ulrich suggested the solution presented in notes
157-67 and the accompanying text. Id. See Jackson, supra note 144, at 857-907 (discussing
reasons that bankruptcy law should recognize in bankruptcy proceedings creditors' rights under
state law, such as security interests).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
158. Interviews with Joesph Ulrich, Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law,
in Lexington, Va. (Jan.-Apr. 1988).
159. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing that upon request of
party in interest, court may order trustee to abandon any property of estate that is burdensome
to estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to estate).
160. Interviews with Joseph Ulrich, Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law,
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the property, thus would be free to foreclose on the debtor's property.1
65
Realizing that the senior lienholder could foreclose on the property, the
debtor might choose to pay off the senior lien.166 If the debtor pays off the
senior lien, the senior lienholder would receive satisfaction of his debt and
the debtor could retain his home.167 By allowing the junior lienholder to
bid for and buy the property, bankruptcy courts would promote fair results
for junior lienholders, senior lienholders, and for debtors.' 6 Junior lien-
holders would benefit because the junior lienholder would lose his lien only
if the junior lienholder declines to bid for and buy the property from the
bankruptcy court. 69 Senior lienholders would benefit because the senior
lienholder retains his lien until the debtor pays off the lien or until the
senior lienholder forecloses and sells the property.170 Debtors would benefit
because if the trustee voids the junior lien, the debtor may retain his home
by paying off the senior lien.'
7'
In light of the diverging lines of authority on the proper use of section
506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress should clarify the meaning of
section 506(d). 72 In the absence of congressional action, however, bank-
ruptcy courts should follow the Mahaner analysis and not allow debtors to
void liens to the extent that the liens exceed the fair market value of the
property. 7  Bankruptcy courts, further, could order that trustees abandon
to the debtor the heavily encumbered property. 74 By abandoning heavily
encumbered property and allowing the junior lienholder to buy the property,
bankruptcy courts would give junior lienholders the opportunity to protect
their interests in the debtor's property. 75 Senior lienholders would retain
165. See generally R. KRATovn. & R. WERNER, supra note 7, at 389-96 (discussing state
law foreclosure sales).
166. Interviews with Joesph Ulrich, Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law,
in Lexington, Va. (Jan.-Apr. 1988).
167. See R. KRATOVI & R. WERNER, supra note 7, at 389 (providing that before foreclosure
sale, mortgagor may pay off mortgage and stop foreclosure).
168. See supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text (explaining that bankruptcy court's
decision to let junior lienholder bid for and buy property promotes fair results for senior and
junior lienholders and for debtor).
169. See supra notes 156-64 (noting that junior lienholder would lose lien only if junior
lienholder declines to bid for and buy property).
170. See supra notes 156-167 and accompanying text (explaining that by permitting junior
lienholder to bid for and buy property, bankruptcy court promotes fair result for senior
lienholder).
171. See id. (explaining that by voiding junior lien if junior lienholder declines to buy
property, bankruptcy court promotes fair result for debtor). A debtor always has the option
to pay off all of the liens to retain the property. See generally G. NELSON & D. W rMAsN,
supra note 19, at § 7.3 (providing that mortgagee is entitled to payment in full and to retain
lien on land until mortgagor pays debt in full).
172. See supra note 14 (listing two divergent lines of authority on whether debtor may
use § 506(d) to void real property lien to extent that lien exceeds value of collateral).
173. See supra notes 126-47 (discussing strengths of Mahaner reasoning).
174. Interviews with Joseph Ulrich, Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law,




their liens and would be able to foreclose on the debtor's property. 176
Debtors also may be able to retain their property by paying off the liens.
177
By not allowing debtors initially to void liens to the extent that the liens
exceed the value of the collateral, bankruptcy courts would preserve in
bankruptcy creditors' rights under state law. 17 Further, bankruptcy courts
would promote the Bankruptcy Code's objective of equitably distributing a





178. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (explaining that Mahaner reasoning
preserves in bankruptcy proceeding creditors' rights under state law).
179. See supra note 2 (describing Bankruptcy Code's policies of providing debtor with
fresh start and of providing creditors with equitable distribution of debtor's assets); supra
notes 130-36 (outlining Mahaner reasoning that recognizes that legislative history of § 506(d)
does not indicate that Congress intended for § 506(d) to further fresh start policy of Bankruptcy
Code).
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